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The Emergence' of the Hellenic
Deliberative Ideal: The Classical
Humanist Conception of
Comparative Law
B Y RICHARD BROOKS*
I. Introduction
The historical, philosophical, rhetorical, and dramatic works
which emerged from the history of ancient Greece hold possible les-
sons for modern comparative law.2 In some ways, like the Greeks and
Romans, we face similar problems of globalization in the expansion
of markets and the "global" conflicts of different political and cultural
creeds. Comparative law was nonexistent in the Hellenic world, in
part because a distinct set of legal institutions did not exist. As a con-
1. I wish to distinguish my account of the emergence of the Hellenic ideal and
its relevance to comparative law from the excellent and, in my mind, much more
scholarly efforts of other comparative law scholars interested in the classical period;
such works include the writings of James Gordley, who carefully traces the evolution
of contract doctrine and principles from the classical period, JAMES GORDLEY,
FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(2006); Patrick Glenn, who views classical law through a thoughtful classification of
legal traditions, PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (2000); and the
recent outpouring of efforts to describe the law of Athens based upon the fragmen-
tary evidence of how Athenian law functions. Instead, I have chosen to take some of
the major works of this period, briefly describe the context in which they were writ-
ten and suggest a framework of assumptions by which they might be understood.
Then, I explore how these assumptions might be relevant to another approach to
modern (or postmodern) law. I freely acknowledge my "creative" interpretation of
the materials of the Hellenic Greek period, but suggest that the test of my approach
lies in whether a new way of thinking about the comparative law venture results.
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I would like to acknowledge Laura
Gillen's work in word processing and thank Professor Carl Yirka for his comments.
2. Customarily, the comparison is made between Rome and some more modern
empire. See, e.g., STRINGFELLOW BARR, CONSULTING THE ROMAN: AN ANALOGY
BETWEEN ANCIENT ROME AND PRESENT DAY AMERICA (1967).
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sequence, there were no treatises on law.3 However, laws and legal
regimes were compared in the Hellenic histories, philosophies, ac-
counts of rhetoric, and drama. These non-legal materials provide the
Hellenic roots of comparative law based upon the deliberative ideal.
Hellenic' accounts of comparative law shed new light upon the
fundamental assumptions of comparative law. One fundamental as-
sumption of modern comparative law is the political freedom of de-
liberation: the deliberative judgment between different legal regimes
or different specific laws.5 The notion of the capacity of choice
emerged in the Hellenic world out of an earlier Homeric background
of fate and necessity. When it emerged, it provided the model for po-
litical deliberation,6 a practical method by which choices might be
made. The steps of this method were informed by the disciplines first
introduced in the Hellenic age. History provided contextual conflicts
out of which the comparative choice emerged. Philosophy helped to
articulate the political goals sought and ways of thinking about those
goals. Rhetoric supplied the arguments for or against the alternatives
given. The final choice and judgment were dramatized in the dramas
of the day, studied through the discipline of poetics. The Hellenic
world did not supply a legal discipline because law itself was not an
articulate and separate institution from ongoing political life.7
3. Although Aristotle is reputed to have written a now lost treatise on justice.
See DIOGENES LAERTIUS, THE LIVES AND OPINIONS OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS
(trans. C.D. Yonge 1856).
4. By "Hellenic" I am referring to the Hellenic classical authors beginning with
Homer and extending through Polybius. Thus, the period does not include Hellenis-
tic authors, such as Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, and Cynics, nor ancient "academics"
and later Aristotleans. "Hellenic" is obviously a slippery term, which Toynbee ex-
tends to include the early Roman civilization based upon its human oriented culture.
ARNOLD TOYNBEE, HELLENISM (1959). I have somewhat arbitrarily limited the pe-
riod from Homer (roughly 750 B.C.) to the advent of Macedon in 338 B.C. This arti-
cle is one of a possible series which will include attention to the Hellenistic, secular
Roman, and Christian sources of comparative law. The assumption, remained to be
proven, is that these sources offer a better approach to comparative law than the fo-
cus upon the Enlightenment "science of law" or the rise of global markets - a focus
often given to explain the assumptions of modern comparative law.
5. This assumption is ignored in modern comparative law which focuses upon
knowledge - the science necessary to compare laws. The emphasis upon science in
comparative law is nicely traced in JEROME HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL
THEORY (1963).
6. The model for deliberation here was best articulated by Aristotle and has
been reformulated in modern times by VALERIE TIBERIUS, DELIBERATION ABOUT
THE GOOD (2000), and HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT
FINAL ENDS (1994).
7. Of course, the precise nature of the Greek legal system over time is much de-
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Unlike the science of comparative law, the classical model of de-
liberative choice for comparative law offers an escape from the prob-
lem of bridging the gap between the descriptive and prescriptive rec-
ommendations in comparative law. The classical model is more
appropriate for the practical activities of modern comparative law, al-
lowing it to escape from the sterile and scientific inquiry of the
Enlightenment.' Comparative law is, and should be, a part of the tu-
multuous everyday life. Today, we witness the efforts of comparativ-
ists offering practical advice to constitution makers in Iraq,9 those
adopting tort principles in the common market,0 those seeking to
fashion proper rules related to abortion," and judges considering
capital punishment rules in the United States.
This flowering of comparative law efforts is the product of glob-
alization and multiculturalism, two forces that make us more aware
and open to the laws and legal practices of other regimes. The pre-
sent is a period not unlike that of early Greece, when a transforma-
tion took place from the bureaucratic kingships of the Hittites to the
open participatory polis." It was in this period that Athenian trade
and its seeking of empire brought Greece into sustained contact with
"other" regimes and ways of life. We are returning to the Hellenic
age of Plato and Aristotle, in which laws from different regimes were
viewed as part a grander world order. The history of these regimes
supplied the legal materials to determine which laws would be most
bated. For discussions of that system, see MICHAEL GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAW
(1986); DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS (1978); S.C.
DODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW (1993); RAPHAEL SEALEY, THE JUSTICE OF
THE GREEKS (1994).
8. JOHN GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT'S WAKE: POLITICS AND CULTURE AT THE
CLOSE OF THE MODERN AGE (1995). Perhaps another historical time in which com-
parative law escaped from the academy is the period of English colonization, during
which efforts were made to spread an Anglo-American constitution. See P.S.
ATIYAH, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987).
9. See Dick Howard, Toward Constitutional Democracy: An American Per-
spective, 19 J.L. & POL. 285 (2003).
10. Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union: Not A U.S. Analog, 5
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 341 (2000); Gregory Scott, Product Liability Laws in the
E. U. in 1992, 18 W.M. MITCHELL L. REV. 357 (1992); Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning,
Heirs of Leonardo: Cultural Obstacles to Strict Product Liability in Italy, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1994).
11. MARY ANN GLENDAN, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
12. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (discussed below).
13. This change is described in JEAN PIERRE VERNANT, THE ORIGINS OF GREEK
THOUGHT (1982).
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appropriate for the creation of a new legal regime or the preservation
of an old one. 4
Humanistic 5 studies lie at the heart of comparative law by con-
tributing to the articulation of a method of political deliberation and
choice between different regimes and laws. "Humanism" refers to
the broad range of humanities - history, philosophy, rhetoric, and po-
etics - which contribute to the deliberative choice.16 Historians, phi-
losophers, rhetoricians, and dramatists are the focus of this inquiry,
not only because in the ancient world there was no specialized field of
comparative law, but also because they approached the topic of com-
parative law as part of the humanistic disciplines which inform the
process of human deliberation and choice.
The methods of inquiry and presentation of the authors dis-
cussed below differ radically because these authors include historians,
philosophers, rhetoricians and dramatists. Although the regimes they
describe included a tremendous pluralism of languages, peoples, and
cultures, they offer a common "classical" approach to the study of
laws of different "pre-national" poli, where governance centered on
the deliberative process.
These works demonstrate how a more general humanistic ap-
proach is relevant to understanding comparative law, and is superior
to narrower, more specialized approaches. The humanistic approach
14. For other efforts to "appeal" to the classics and their relevance to the interna-
tional issues of today, see THOMAS PANGLE & PETER AHRENSDORF, JUSTICE AMONG
NATIONS: ON THE MORAL BASIS OF POWER AND PEACE (1999); RAYMOND ARON,
THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC (1974); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY
(1996); ANTHONY APIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS
(2006). It is worth noting that Nussbaum appeals to Stoic ideals, whereas Apiah
draws upon the Cynics.
15. By "humanist," I refer to both the traditional account of humanism. See, e.g.,
ALAN BULLOCK, THE HUMANIST TRADITION IN THE WEST (1985); see also EDWARD
SAID, HUMANISM AND DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM (2004) (presenting more postmodern
definitions than Bullock). The writing of Said is especially important to my argument
in this article. While acknowledging the value of humanistic works of Western civili-
zation, Said recognizes their "Eurocentricism" and the need to correct their biases in
light of their limited historical context, tacit exclusion of attention to important social
and economic groups, and failure to employ disciplines of self-criticism in the course
of reading their works. Said urges the resurrection of a philological approach to their
texts. I am aware that the concept of "humanism" may be considered anachronistic
as applied to ancient Greek writings, since the concept probably arose either with
Cicero or in the early Renaissance. Nevertheless, the concept of humanism is fre-
quently applied to the ancient Greeks.
16. The term "humanism" was coined in the Renaissance and employed anach-
ronistically to apply to Greek thought. Humanism in Italy, 2 DICTIONARY IN THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 515 (1973).
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recognizes the centrality of free human deliberation informed by the
contributions of history, philosophy, rhetoric and judgment. While
the classical view preceded the Enlightenment approach to compara-
tive law, its unique insights and principles - which could have con-
tributed to comparative law - were unfortunately lost to history and
the decline of classical learning. 7
17. A more serious objection to my appeal to classic sources as supplying the ele-
ments of a deliberative approach to comparative law may be the postmodern sugges-
tion that an appeal to classical sources ignores the rich disharmony of many past and
present cultures which should inform any humanistic analysis of law. Some will also
charge that my focus upon the Greeks is a not so subtle attempt to smuggle a discred-
ited part of the intellectual canon into comparative law. By suggesting the impor-
tance of these "canonic" authors, it will be suggested that I am joining the "culture
wars," i.e., promoting some form of elitism set forth in many of these works and im-
plied by their adoption. For a particularly clear and helpful discussion of the wars
over the canon, see WILLIAM CASEMENT, THE GREAT CANON CONTROVERSY: THE
BATTLE OF BOOKS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1996).
None of these postmodern charges apply to my effort. First, I seek to demon-
strate below that the Greek authors, in addition to their commonalities, offer a sur-
prisingly diverse view of the human condition - a fact which has been recognized in
postmodern studies. For example, comparative law in the ancient world can take the
form of many diverse disciplines: rhetoric, history, philosophy, and so forth. These
multiple disciplines were all viewed as legitimate ways by which the considerations
now dealt with by modern comparative law could be approached.
Not only does ancient comparative law embrace different disciplines, but ancient
theorists betray fundamentally different views of the role of law. Thucydides' de-
scriptive history of power politics between Athens and Sparta may be seen as the
kind of "Thrasymachean" view of justice which Plato was anxious to refute. Thus,
not only do these ancient theorists have different methods and perspectives, but these
views conflict either implicitly or, as in the case of Plato and Aristotle, explicitly. In-
dividual figures in ancient thought may embrace such conflicts within their thought.
Perhaps the most "modern" of these figures is Cicero, whose skeptical view of differ-
ent philosophies, theologies, and political positions would warm the heart of many
postmodernists. For an excellent description of Cicero's philosophy, see Richard
McKeon, Introduction to the Philosophy of Plato, in MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO,
BRUTUS, ON THE NATURE OF GODS, ON DIVINATION, ON DUTIES (1950).
Postmodernists properly wonder which of the ancient's view of comparative law
applies to this discussion. In her recent book Post Modern Plato, Catherine Zuckert
demonstrates the different interpretations of Plato by Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Gadamer, Strauss and Derrida. CATHERINE ZUCKERT, POSTMODERN PLATOS:
NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, GADAMER, STRAUSS, DERRIDA (1996); see also MELISSA
LANE, PLATO'S PROGENY (2001). Insofar as we "inherit" or agree with any (or all) of
these interpretations, we find the ancient tradition of comparative law a rich and con-
flicting source of thought upon which to draw conclusions.
The postmodern recognition of plurality cannot eliminate the need to choose in
our modern world, in which regimes and laws collide with one with another. Since
choice is necessary, deliberation about that choice is also necessary. Such deliberate
choice lies at the heart of comparative law. A better way to understand a postmod-
ern perspective on comparative law is that postmodernism contributes alternatives to
2006]
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1I. The Enlightenment and the Modern Day
The recent welcoming of comparative law in the chambers of
American courts has not been an easy one. Despite renewed interest
in comparative law as part of practical ventures in the "real world," a
recent dispute has arisen between U.S. Supreme Court justices over
whether the Supreme Court should consult and cite to foreign laws
when making its decisions. This argument has once again raised the
more general question of the relevance of comparative law to ongoing
legal practice. In the debate, Justice Scalia argues that the consulta-
tion and citation of comparative law is wrong since it is irrelevant to
the interpretation of authoritative and unique text of the U.S. law.
Moreover, Scalia suggests that such sources are difficult to reference
and will be subject to manipulation. 8 In contrast, Justice Breyer
views foreign sources of law as informing a shared deliberation of
human beings in different countries about the common practical legal
problems they face. 9 The United States Congress has weighed in
with proposed legislation which would prohibit the use of foreign law
sources in court decisions. 2°
deliberative choice and provides a basis for the follow-up critique of deliberative
choice. In his Humanism and Democratic Criticism, Edward Said argues for this role
of critique. SAID, supra note 15. In short, beginning with humanist works does not
preclude an open and inclusive view of present day pluralism and its relevance to
comparative law. Humanist works avoid the impasse of the Enlightenment's version
of comparative law - the often arid classification of legal regimes and the postmodern
accounts of conflicts - by adopting the classical vision of comparative law as delibera-
tive choice. Instead, these classic authors approach the comparison of legal regimes
by adopting pragmatic methods that public leaders, historians, and dramatists can
employ to deliberate in a practical manner, speak and write about the what the law is,
what the best (or second best) regime might be, and what the best and most reason-
able law could be.
Comparative law deliberation may take place in the enactment, interpretation,
application, or implementation of laws. For example, Iraqis wishing to formulate a
new constitution may wish to look to other laws in formulating such a constitution.
However, it might not follow that Iraqi courts may or should ignore Islamic law in
making specific decisions. Comparative law deliberation may be part of a court's in-
terpretation and application of the law. And if an American executive faces the
question of how to implement that constitution or law, another country's experiences
of implementing such a law might be relevant.
18. See Jens C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative Law in Statutory and Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513, 530-31 (2002), for an overview of the
debate. The basis for Antonin Scalia's approach is set forth in his book, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
19. STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
20. H.R.J. Res. 97, 108th Cong. (2005).
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This debate might never have arisen had the Enlightenment Pro-
ject of comparative law been successful. The Enlightenment Project
envisaged the scientific study of comparative laws for the purpose of
identifying the best laws and legal regimes. This identification was to
be achieved by classifying legal systems; comparing laws, which would
lead to the discovery of universal laws; and deducing a pattern of evo-
lution of law, which could guide the scholar and lawmaker to antici-
pate the development of the best regime." The Enlightenment efforts
appealed to an Enlightenment "science" in which comparative law,
philosophy, and other intellectual endeavors were considered capable
of finding objective laws of nature, thought, and social action. There
would be no need to debate the use of foreign law if such a scientific
study yielded an objective account of "the best law" because this law
would be available for the justices to consult.
Whether the Enlightenment failed in all its ambitions, it certainly
did not yield any set of "best laws." The Enlightenment compared
laws without finding any "best law," despite its pseudo-scientific ap-
peal to classifications and the evolution of law (i.e., the law evolves to
its best form). The subsequent use of social science to find the best
law in the early twentieth century was also not successful. After the
abandonment of evolutionary theories and sporadic social science
theories in the mid-twentieth century, comparative law focused upon
various efforts to categorize legal systems into "families," "systems,"
and "traditions" of law. Following this grand comparison of legal sys-
tems - not unlike the earlier grand taxonomies of flora and fauna in
the late 1800s - was an effort to compare legal institutions and the
specific laws within systems. While this effort suggested a grand
"method of comparison,"22 the method failed to generate any final
agreed upon best laws. The effort instead produced a tableau of por-
traits of legal regimes23 followed by much debate about if and how the
comparative regimes and their laws might be compared. A policy-
oriented instrumental approach was also proposed in which the "de-
21. For one of many accounts of this effort, see Jerome Hall, COMPARATIVE LAW
AND SOCIAL THEORY 15 (1963). Hall suggests that despite this failure, modern social
science can supply the social theory necessary to ground any comparison. Later in
this paper, I draw upon Hall's suggestions in discussing the functions of punishment.
22. H.C. GUTrERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW (1949).
23. The classic "tableau" was RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD TODAY (3rd ed. 1985). Central to the classification was the distinc-
tion between code law and common law countries. For a recent account of the relations be-
tween science and codification, see ROGER BERKOWITZ, THE GIFT OF SCIENCE: LEIBNIZ AND
THE MODERN LEGAL TRADITION (2005).
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mocratic objectives" were assumed and regimes were compared as
better or worse means of achieving those objectives."
With the failure of the Enlightenment Project to produce an "ob-
jective result" of a best law, it is understandable that present day jus-
tices are left to debate whether ad hoc comparisons of domestic and
foreign laws are useful. Is Justice Breyer correct to hope for lessons
from a comparative law study or is Justice Scalia right to scoff at the
appeal to such comparisons? The studies of comparative law em-
ployed in various situations contribute to the resolution of practical
problems: the fashioning a new constitution for Iraq, the comparison
of approaches to capital punishment, the adoption of principles of
tort law for nations, and the deliberation about the proper form of
abortion law. But if the Enlightenment science does not provide the
best law, what purpose does comparative law serve and what method
should be adopted?
Answering this question requires a different approach to com-
parative law. This article begins with an alternative approach to
comparative law: the "classical humanist conception." "Classical" re-
fers broadly to the approaches to comparative law before the
Enlightenment, embracing efforts made in classical Greece and
Rome, the Middle Ages, as well as the Renaissance. "Classical" re-
fers to these ancient figures and the implicit notion of classical form
which is historically associated with these and other figures. Forms
are the orders found in the histories, biographies, philosophies, politi-
cal regimes, dramas, and speeches, and the method of understanding
of these human creations. More specifically, this article argues for an
ordered deliberation within the discipline of comparative law. 5 How-
ever, the scope of this article is limited to only a selection of ap-
proaches to comparative law during the classical Hellenic period26:
Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius; philosophers, including Plato
and Aristotle; rhetoricians such as Isocrates; and dramatists such as
Euripides and Sophocles.
24. Myres McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes, 1 AM. J.
COMP. L. 24 (1952). Although McDougal recognized that deliberation could specify
the policy purposes, he offered no disparities of the resolution of conflicting pur-
poses.
25. For a recent exploration of the "classical," see JAMES PORTER, THE
CLASSICAL TRADITIONS OF GREECE AND ROME (2005). I am painfully aware that the
appeal to an ordered form seems quaint to many in our postmodern age.
26. In future articles, I hope to turn to the contributions made by Hellenistic,
Roman, Christian, medieval, and Renaissance thought.
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The brief thumbnail sketch of the Greek ancients below omits
key figures like the poets Homer and Hesiod, the Stoics, Skeptics,
Cynics, and Epicurean philosophers, and other Hellenistic rhetori-
cians and dramatists.27 The Roman historians, rhetoricians, poets and
dramatists are not included because their contributions are based
upon the emergence of a distinct Roman legal system which distin-
guishes them from the Hellenic period.
The works of the listed Greek authors have arisen out of a
shared history in which multiple ancient regimes interacted. This his-
tory "began" with the Homeric overwhelming recognition of neces-
sity, fate, chance, uncontrollable passion, and the influences of the
gods in the affairs of man.' Only gradually did the notion of a secular
freedom of choice emerge. The subsequent history included the rise
of Persia described in Herodotus's history; the rise of Greece as por-
trayed in Sophoclean plays; the conflict between Athens and Greece
which Thucydides recounted; the philosophical reaction to that loss
by Plato and Aristotle; the rise of the rhetoricians as expressed in the
works of Isocrates; and the absorption of Greece within the rise of
Rome as described by Polybius.
Some suggest that there is no need to go back to classical times
to recover a humanistic view of comparative law as a deliberative dis-
cipline. Certainly humanism was reborn during the Renaissance,
again during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and since that
time there have been commendable efforts to revive the humanities
both in general and as applied to law and comparative law.29 But
these more modern efforts of humanism usually look backward to the
classic works of Greece and Rome. Consequently, it seems appropri-
ate to begin with the classic works themselves.
27. I believe that the Hellenistic philosophers make a unique contribution to the
premises of comparative law - a contribution which I shall describe in the next arti-
cle.
28. For an account of the many different notions of fate and necessity, see
BERNARD DIETRICH, DEATH, FATE AND THE GODS; THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
RELIGIOUS IDEA IN GREEK POPULAR BELIEF AND IN HOMER (1965). Some have ar-
gued that even in Homer, a notion of secular politics emerges. E.g., DEAN MANNER,
THE ILIAD AS POLITICS: THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002). Others
have suggested that the notion of deliberation emerges in the Odyssey. E.g., JEFFREY
BARNOVER, ODYSSEUS, HERO OF PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE: DELIBERATION AND
SIGNS IN HOMER'S ODYSSEY (2004).
29. For one of many discussions of the classical heritage upon our Founders'
thought, see CARL RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME
AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1994).
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III. The Classical Study of Comparative Law
The classical view of comparative law regimes yields a broad
humanist interpretation of comparative law as a process of delibera-
tive choice. This is the result of: (1) the historical convergence of the
comparative conflicting histories of regimes and the laws they have
adopted; (2) an evaluation of these laws in the context of more gen-
eral ethical and political efforts to define the principles of the good
life, the good state, or the good legal regime; (3) the recognition of
the conflicting alternatives and, consequently, the rhetorical argu-
mentation which arises on behalf of these alternatives; and (4) a
judgment between incommensurable alternatives of the law in the
face of the emotional conflicts.
The classical study of comparative law views history as a series of
problematic situations in which choice is made among contempora-
neous live options. These choices do not occur between hermetically
sealed traditions, but rather, moving traditions made relevant to one
another through encounters in history. Alternative laws are selected
according to goals that arise from history. However, philosophical
analysis - which is above and beyond history - produces the final ar-
ticulation of these goals. The capacity to articulate such goals is part
of the political freedom of inquiry and critique. The deliberation
about alternative laws begins with incompatible laws and legal re-
gimes that cannot be reduced to common standards, but can be the
subject of rhetorical arguments that appeal to reason and emotion.
The choice made between the laws is fundamentally political and dra-
matic. However, this judgment, although not based upon science nor
deduction, is a form of rational choice which depends upon the free-
dom of political choice. Regret necessarily results from this decision
because such a choice requires declining one or another alternative.
Knowledge of comparative law comes from legal scholars or
practitioners who actively deliberate and participate as citizens, advo-
cates, or scholars in the legal world. This active deliberation may
yield general conclusions about laws and their merits, a sense of the
differences among the laws, and a heightened understanding of the
individual identities and laws of different regimes. Understanding the
histories, ideas, and different ways of life of regimes and the regret
inherent in choosing among them, enables the use of comparative law
to critique the choices made.
The assumption of political freedom underlies the practical di-
[Vol. 30:1
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mension of the classical humanistic view of comparative law.3° The
ancient historians, especially Polybius, were anxious to distinguish the
workings of fate from the human causes of history. Deliberative
choices were understood to precede fate. These choices were drama-
tized in Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War and his re-
enactment of choices preceded by arguments on either side.31 In addi-
tion to the work of Polybius and Thucydides, both Plato and Aristotle
offered philosophic assessments of choices between the best and
"second best" regimes in light of dialectical definitions of the good
state. Aristotle deemed this knowledge to be useful for founding new
communities, improving existing regimes, and preserving govern-
ments. Greek rhetoricians used arguments praising or blaming law-
makers to evoke emotions in their audiences. Rhetoricians designed
rhetorical arguments which could support the alternatives that delib-
erative choice presented. Greek dramatists offer opportunities to ex-
perience and purge the emotions arising out of conflicts and choice
between different realms of law within the polis.
IV. The Hellenic Emergence of Deliberative
Comparative Law
The Hellenic intellectual figures are organized in terms of the
contribution they make to the deliberative ideal. The historians pro-
vide knowledge of the contextual conflicts which give rise to the need
to deliberate about comparative laws. The philosophers offer analysis
of the objectives of that deliberation. The rhetoricians supply the ar-
guments, pro and con. Finally, the dramatists reveal the anguish of
choice and the consequences of judgments.
A. The Historians:
1. History As the Generator of Alternatives for Deliberation
Hellenic historians viewed the events of their own age within a
broader sweep of ancient history, trying to find in that history the
30. For a systematic effort to define political freedom, see MORTIMER J. ADLER,
THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: A DIALECTICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF
FREEDOM, 329-369 (1958). My view of the emergence of political freedom at the core
of comparative law parallels Hegel's view of the unique contribution of the Greeks in
his PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 274 (1952).
31. THUCYDIDES (C. Forster Smith, trans., G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1919) (1540). For
a discussion of these deliberations in THUCYDIDES, see MARC COGAN, THE HUMAN
THING (1981).
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fundamental causes or patterns of these events. This search
prompted them to study different regimes that contributed to the rise
or fall of other regimes. Herodotus completed The Histories, a mas-
sive account of the Persian war between Persia and Athens and its
causes." Herodotus gave a detailed account of the history beginning
in 559 B.C. in Persia, traced the history of Egypt (which Persia con-
quered), and Athens, and concluded with the defeat of Persia by
Athens and her allies in the mid-fifth century B.C.3 Herodotus's com-
prehensive history is a story of the interaction between three very dif-
ferent places: Persia, Egypt, and Athens 4 While The Histories de-
scribes the exchange of laws and customs of these regimes, it portrays
three distinct and incommensurable cultures of which law played a
small part.35
In his search for the fundamental causes of the Persian wars, He-
rodotus describes the environments, customs, laws and public actions
of Persia, Athens and Egypt.36 He views law both in the context of
nature and the historically changing customs of the countries.37 He-
rodotus offers vignettes of early legal history to illustrate how that
history contributed to the strength or weakness of the different re-
gimes.38 For example, changing the laws of Sparta before and after
Lycurgus strengthened Sparta and allowed it to later confront the
Persians. 9 Although Herodotus gives an account of the laws within
their local culture, he also views laws in their international context.
For instance, the Spartan law punishing those who lose in battle was
viewed as a possible deterrent to other regimes engaging the Spartans
in war.40 Herodotus also makes more universal comparisons of politi-
cal regimes, distinguishing between democracy, oligarchy, and king-
ship.4' He makes this comparison after the Persians had successfully
thrown off the rule of the Magi and were contemplating what form of
32. I have relied upon Robin Waterfield's new translation, HERODOTUS: THE
HISTORIES (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford University Press 1998). Book One dis-
cusses Persia (pp. 3-94); Book Two describes Egyptian history and culture (pp. 95-







39. Id Book Six, at 371.
40. HERODETUS, supra note 32.
41. Id.
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government they should adopt.42 Participants in the course of history
engaged in the comparison of laws, and the laws they chose strength-
ened the Persian regime.43 Herodotus demonstrates how different re-
gimes' laws help shape their futures.
Herodotus' history has been criticized as unscientific. One of
those critics was Thucydides who claimed to write a scientific history
of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (which fol-
lowed the events described in Herodotus)." Unlike the Herodotean
account, which ended with the triumph of Athens, the Peloponnesian
War defeated the Athenian empire, which never fully recovered.
Thucydides sought to describe the causes of the war and the Athenian
defeat.45 Unlike Herodotus, whom Thucydides criticizes, Thucydides
focuses on political regimes and history at the time of the war.46 Thu-
cydides obliquely discusses the domestic governmental arrangements
of Sparta and Athens, an account that differs from Pericles' portrayal
of Athenian law as part of a proud democratic regime committed to
freedom of its citizens.
Thucydides mentions Spartan political institutions only in pass-
ing.48 But he does portray Sparta's educational system, subjugation of
the nearby Helots, and respect for religious deities. 49 Thucydides dis-
cusses domestic governments and laws, political leaders and factions,
and political speeches and assemblies to assess how they were part of
an international historical movement." In addition to domestic laws,
treaties existed between Athens and Sparta that briefly interrupted
the war.5' Thucydides mentions these domestic and international laws
only to demonstrate how they contributed to the common history be-
tween Athens and Sparta. 2
Due to the war's catastrophic consequences for Athens, Thucy-
dides is sometimes seen as a tragic dramatist. But such a view is not
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. THUCYDIDES, THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Robert B. Strassler, ed., 1996). For an excellent discus-
sion of this work, see DAVID GRENE, MAN IN His PRIDE (1950).
45. See id
46. See id.
47. Pericles' speech is set forth on pp. 123-217.
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supported by the text. Thucydides attempted to write a scientific his-
tory, and his narration shows that the historical parties made many
decisions as free responses to the circumstances they faced. 3
Thucydides adds to comparative law by revealing how the laws of
different countries and the politics underlying those laws shape these
countries' responses to one another. According to Thucydides, coun-
tries should compare laws and examine their contexts and policies as
part of a careful political history of nations and their interaction with
the world.54
In The Rise of the Roman Empire, Polybius, also a Greek, pre-
sents a contemporaneous account of the Punic Wars. Polybius pro-
poses a universal history both by trying to embody the history of the
known Roman world and claiming discovery of universal laws of con-
stitutions and their changes over time. 6
Polybius advances a matrix of constitutions and other laws that
are similar in many ways to the accounts of Aristotle and Plato. He
juxtaposes the desirable rule of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democ-
racy against an undesirable Tyranny, Oligopoly, and Mobocracy"
But like Plato, Polybius sees a predictable process of change in the
18regimes. And, unlike Plato's Republic, he believes that a properly
mixed regime is one which can escape the otherwise inevitable cycle
of change. 9 Polybius's belief that Rome moved towards the adoption
of such a mixed constitution throughout the history of the Punic War
connects his work to history.6°
2. Lessons of Hellenic History
The basic premise of historians is that laws converge or conflict
because statesmen choose among laws over the course of history.
Comparing laws, rather than examining them in static classifications,
teaches us that laws are products of both their respective regimes and
a larger history of different regimes with which they interact. Histori-
53. These decisions are dramatized by the technique of "inventing" debates,
speeches, and dialogues among the historical parties. See, e.g., Astymachus' speech
and the Theban response at pp. 185-193.
54. THUCYDIDES, supra note 31, at 14, 15.
55. POLYBIUs, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (Ian Scott-Kilvert trans., 1979).
56. Id at 41-41.
57. POLYBIUS, supra note 55.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 302-353.
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cal linkages among nations may produce these cultural and political
interactions. The domestic laws may be both the cause and conse-
quence of "inter-national" history. At the same time, the cultures of
these communities, which are often at war, suggest some incom-
mensurability between legal regimes. For historians like Polybius,
history may produce a pattern of progress and decline in which the
different regimes and laws are described and measured. Historians
offer an account of the starting points of political deliberation, which
history uses to yield alternatives choices.
A modern example of the importance of such convergence is the
United States' effort to "nation-build" in Iraq. In addition to using
force and forms of economic assistance, the United States is trying to
rebuild Iraq's legal system. The rebuilding process includes proposals
for a new constitution and a provision for an interim constitution.
Commentary suggests that the constitution largely derives from the
Western experience with constitutions, including the separation and
balance of powers, a mostly secular government, and a set of rights.
The constitution and its adoption are part of forming a new Iraqi gov-
ernment. However, national and international history precedes the
constitution's adoption. An outgrowth of the Byzantine and Persian
empires, Iraq was the somewhat arbitrary result of decisions make by
Western powers."1 The French and Egyptian Codes heavily shaped
Iraq's Civil Code.62 The resulting Code reflected influences such as
the communist-inspired Sunni Baath party and aspects of Islamic
law.63 During the twentieth century, Iraq was briefly exposed to de-
mocratic practices, but always by Western powers interested in Iraqi
oil.64 A small group of closely related officials controlled the Iraqi
state before the recent war.65 This group wielded power through Iraqi
oil wealth and the military.6  The leaders' client groups honey-
combed the government, which was fractured by both religious
groups (Sunni, Shi'ite, and Christian), and cultural groups including
the Kurds.67 The new constitution had to paper over these fundamen-
61. The following statements depend upon CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ
(2000); S.H. AMIN, LEGAL SYSTEM OF IRAQ (1989).
62. TRIPP, supra note 61; AMIN, supra note 61.
63. TRIPP, supra note 61; AMIN, supra note 61.
64. TRIPP, supra note 61, at 148-192.
65. TRIPP, supra note 61; AMIN, supra note 61.
66. TRIPP, supra note 61; AMIN, supra note 61.
67. TRIPP, supra note 61; AMIN, supra note 61.
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tal divisions in the body politic. 68 The history of the United States and
its long involvement with other nations is also relevant to understand-
ing the Iraqi Constitution. The U.S. effort to "spread democracy" is
inextricably mixed with its long history of building a form of hegem-
ony, if not an empire.69 It was this American history which converged
with Iraq's history to provide the current constitutional choices in
Iraq. Any effort to "compare" the laws of the United States and Iraq
must begin with the history of the two countries and their interac-
tions. History yields conflicts that comparative law can resolve, at
least in part.
B. The Philosophers
1. The Goals of Deliberation in Comparative Law
The classic philosophers envisaged an important practical role
for comparative law. According to these philosophers, comparative
law provided the material to seriously plan a new colony, determine
the best state under the circumstances, or preserve an existing state.
Classic philosophers also sought to define justice and the best regime
through the dialectic and other forms of inquiry. Writing just after
the Peloponnesian war, both Plato and Aristotle were deeply aware
of the histories of the regimes of their time.'
Plato is seldom thought of as a comparative law scholar. His Re-
public gives scant attention to the role of law, and his Laws71 is often
dismissed as the inferior work of an old man. But Laws is an ex-
tremely sophisticated dialogue among three interlocutors - one from
Athens, one destined to found a colony in Crete, and one from
Sparta.72 The dialogue explores the relative merit of the three sources
of the law.73 Toward the end of the dialogue, Plato recommends a
"Nocturnal Council" which would examine the laws of other commu-
68. The fundamental designs are described in Chapter 6 of TRIPP, supra note 61,
at 192-280.
69. The history of U.S. involvement with other nations is set forth in THOMAS
BENDER, A NATION AMONG NATIONS: AMERICA'S PLACE IN WORLD HISTORY
(2006).
70. ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, in 2 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 53
(Sir Frederick G. Kenyan, trans. Encyclopedia Britannica).
71. I have relied upon Jowett's free-swinging version: PLATO, THE DIALOGUES
OF PLATO (Benjamin Jowett, trans., ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1952) (1937). See
also RICHARD BROOKS, PLATO AND MODERN LAW (forthcoming 2006).
72. PLATO, supra note 71.
73. Id
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nities to explore whether they have laws useful to the new colony.74
According to Plato, the Council was also to include those who had
visited foreign countries in the hope of hearing something that might
be of use in the preservation of the laws.75
Additionally, Plato engages in a comparative inquiry by explor-
ing the laws of Sparta.76 Plato finds that Spartan laws focus on one
part of one virtue - courage - but ultimately fail to teach courage in
the face of pleasures or temperance. 77 He then explores Athenian law
and how one might educate the young in the pleasures of drinking. 8
According to Plato, adopting laws is important because a fledgling
state cannot initially rely upon an educational system to create good
citizens.79 Plato struggles with how to provide incentives for virtue to
such a population.' These incentives include rational incentives (set
forth in the persuasive preambles of laws), pleasures derived from
complying with the law, and punishments for disobeying the law.81
While Plato focuses directly upon the relationship of law to the
virtues of the citizens, Aristotle looks to the relations of the law and
its principles to the political community. 8 Aristotle supposedly col-
lected and studied many constitutions and The Athenian Constitution
is considered his work or the work of one of his students. That study
looks to the history of the distribution of powers and offices in Ath-
ens over time and evaluates the results.83
In Politics, Aristotle offers a classification of political regimes
that political scientists and theorists have continually reinterpreted.'
Unlike the classifications of legal regimes in modern comparative law,
which look to the regime's kind of law (e.g., civil law, common law,
communist law) or legal traditions, Aristotle appears to classify con-
stitutions based upon: the number of people holding power (many,
74. Id.
75. ARISTOTLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon, ed., Ran-
dom House 1941). See also RICHARD BROOKS & JAMES MURPHY, ARISTOTLE AND
MODERN LAW (2003); PLATO, 2 LAWS 506-07 (trans R. G. Bury, Loeb Classics 1926).





81. Id at 305.
82. ARISTOTLE, supra note 70.
83. Id
84. ARISTOTLE, 2 Politics, in 2 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Sir Frederick G. Ken-
yan, trans. Encyclopedia Britannica).
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few, one); the principle of the rule (wealth, freedom, virtue); and the
normative evaluation of the rule (the extent to which the rule is de-
voted to the public good).85 Unlike modern comparative law, which
classifies for its own sake, Aristotle classified regimes in order to an-
swer practical problems such as how to preserve an existing political
regime."
The principles of the different regimes and their laws may con-
flictY Thus, a law providing payment for citizens to attend the as-
sembly may be a democratic law, increasing the access of the many to
the political system." The democratic regime may be animated by the
principle of freedom - "doing as one pleases."" This principle may
conflict with the principles of virtue or wealth, which respectively
animate aristocracy or oligarchy. 9°
The task of dialectic was to resolve conflicts between principles.
Aristotle formulated a discipline of dialectic in Topics.9 In this trea-
tise, he lays out the methods that govern the dialectical discussion of
problems and comparisons. The comparisons embrace appeals to
ends and means, antecedents and consequences, times and seasons,
self sufficiency, ideal patterns, and common standards.93 Other tech-
niques include testing definitions and arguing in a step-by-step man-
nerY These techniques illustrate differences between goals and prin-
ciples. 9
2. Lessons of the Philosophers
The philosophers teach us a great amount about comparative
law. First, philosophers weigh alternative laws normatively in terms
of whether they facilitate a good life and a good political community.
Second, philosophers believe comparative inquiry happens when a
new colony is initiated or an existing state requires improvement or
85. See id.
86. Id. at 439, 455.
87. 2 ARISTOTLE, supra note 75, Nichomean Ethics Book V.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 378.





95. Id at 192.
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preservation. In this sense, the inquiry is a practical one. Third, phi-
losophers contend that societies search for the best or better laws ei-
ther because different communities within the society follow different
laws or simply because inquiry uncovers different laws. Laws are not
chosen merely based upon their classification, but rather upon a dia-
lectic on the relative merits of the laws within an ideal state, a model
exhibiting the laws in operation, or the extent to which the laws re-
solve specific problems of governance.
An inquiry into the purposes of capital punishment in the United
States and elsewhere illustrates the philosophical contribution to
comparative law. The death penalty debate has sharpened as U.S.
law and practice diverges from European and international law. 96
A modern capital punishment case requiring a more careful
comparative philosophical analysis is Roper v. Simmons. The Su-
preme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
hibited executing individuals who were minors when they committed
their capital crimes. In addition to surveying the states, the Court
canvassed world legal opinion and practice by looking at domestic
laws and international agreements.' The Court identified the aboli-
tion of capital punishment in the European Union, specifically in
England.'9 In the words of the Court, "the opinion of the world com-
munity, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected
and significant confirmation for our own conclusions."''
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion rejected the "confirmatory
role" of the international consensus, but argued that the international
consensus could provide a confirmatory role if a national consensus
existed.'02 However, O'Connor did not find a national consensus. 1
3
Scalia, on the other hand, found that the basic premise of the Court's
argument - that American law should conform to the laws of the rest
96. Since I have exemplified the contribution of historical disciplines to delibera-
tive choice in comparative law with the example of the Iraqi Constitution above, I
shall here turn to the discussion of the philosophical clarification of the objectives of
capital punishment to exemplify the second stage of political deliberation underlying
the comparative law venture.
97. 543 U.S.551.
98. Id. at 569-75.
99. Id. at 575-86.
100. Id. at 577-78.
101. Id. at 578.
102. Id. at 587-607
103. Id. at 588.
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of the world - ought to be rejected out of hand.'4 With the exception
of Scalia, the justices in Roper did not carefully compare U.S. law
with foreign laws, but simply cited the number of countries that allow
or prohibit the capital punishment of juveniles.05 This "voting ap-
proach" fails to carefully compare the law of the jurisdictions cited.
The U.S. and European approaches to juvenile execution can be
compared using a philosophical analysis of the purposes of capital
punishment. One way to do this is to define the general purposes of
punishment and compare the applicability of these purposes in differ-
ent nations. Another way requires turning to other central ideas un-
derlying the rationale for capital punishment. Numerous scholars
have philosophically analyzed central ideas like "responsibility,""'
"pride,' ° and "paidiea"' 8 in ancient Greek and Roman cultures.
These concepts may underlie individual works and pervade the works
of an entire Greek and Roman era. An effort to uncover today's cen-
tral ideas would be useful for modern comparative law. A compari-
son of the U.S. and European approaches to juvenile capital punish-
ment should analyze the extent to which the United States and
Europe differ with regard to the social functions and central ideas of
punishment.
1. The Social Functions of Punishment
A massive literature of interpretive social theory discusses the
social functions of punishment1 9 In modern Western nations, the
functions of punishment are to promote social solidarity, construct
state authority, create class authority and domination, sustain rational
modernity, facilitate sensibility, and influence, express, and reinforce
cultural beliefs.1 ' The U.S. and European approaches to capital pun-
ishment can be interpreted in light of these functions.
Social solidarity is a sense of collective social morality that helps
104. Id at 628.
105. See id at 575-86.
106. ARTHUR ADKINS, MERIT AND RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDY IN GREEK VALUES
(1960).
107. DAVID GRENE, MAN IN HIS PRIDE (1949).
108. WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE (Gilbert Highet
trans., Oxford 1946) (1939).
109. For an overview of this literature, both ancient and modern, see DONALD N.
LEVINE, VISIONS OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION (1995).
110. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY (1990). For accounts of social solidarity, construction of authority and the
rationalist of modernity, see id. at 23, 47, 177.
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hold a community together. Although pre-modern societies can look
to custom to develop social solidarity, modern societies must rely on
more formal mechanisms, such as law and the market. The high
crime rate, mobility, and diversity in the United States may therefore
require it to employ more extreme measures of capital punishment as
a means of promoting social solidarity. Conversely, Western Europe
may not require the same "extreme" means of achieving such solidar-
ity due to its lower crime rate and limited diversity and mobility.
Punishment also helps construct authority. The construction of
authority in Germany and Italy led to dangerous abuses in the mid-
twentieth century, including uncontrolled capital punishment."' The
defeat of Germany and Italy in the Second World War and the Nur-
emburg trial produced a German reaction against the death penalty in
the early 1950s." This defeat led to the withdrawal of capital pun-
ishment in both nations after the war."' Conversely, the United
States and its allies employed capital punishment against war crimi-
nals at the end of the war.
Capital punishment is deeply enmeshed in the class systems of
the United States and Europe, as it is applied primarily to the poor
and minority groups."' The poor were most frequently the victims of
such punishment."5 A class-based interpretation of the death penalty
was common in the Weimar Republic; however, the phenomenon of
serial murders by upper class perpetrators at the time and their con-
sequent executions suggested that the perception of the penalty was
not limited to the poor. 6 It is common knowledge that the death
penalty has been disproportionately applied against African Ameri-
cans in the United States. However, recognizing the class-related as-
pects of the death penalty need not remove all support for the pen-
alty. Nor does the fact that the penalty was class-based in other
nations necessarily lead to any conclusion.
Efforts to rationalize the death penalty in Europe and the United
111. Id. at 47-83.
112. RICHARD EVANS, RITUALS OF RETRIBUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
GERMANY 1600-1987 (1996).
113. See id.
114. For general comparisons of European and U.S. practices, see TERENCE
MIETHE & HUNG Lu, PUNISHMENT: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(2005). The role of punishment in general and capital punishment in particular as a
construction of authority and an instrument of class control is set forth in GARLAND,
supra note 110, at 23-131.
115. MIETHE & LU, supra note 114.
116. EVANS, supra note 112.
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States illustrate the prevalence of rationalism in these countries. For
example, before eliminating the death penalty, the Germans went to
extreme lengths to rationalize it as an instrumental means to euthana-
sia and scientific experimentation."7 The United States adopted me-
chanical and then chemical methods of extermination. But such ef-
forts to rationalize the penalty shed little light upon whether the
penalty should be employed against juveniles.
The adoption of the death penalty in the U.S. and its rejection in
Europe illustrate the various functions of punishment. The historical
and social differences between the United States and Europe suggest
that there are good reasons why the penalty should exist in the
United States and not in Europe. A discussion of these social func-
tions in comparative nations does not lead to any definite conclusion
regarding the desirability of the penalty itself. Any comparison of the
broad purposes of punishment suggests the need for a more detailed
analysis of the specific and conventional objectives of punishment,
such as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.
2. Retribution
The history of the purposes of retribution plays the greatest role
in current discussions and jurisprudence of the death penalty.18 Early
colonial and post-colonial religious groups in the United States ad-
hered to the belief in retribution as reflecting God's punishment of
man." 9 The abolition movement in the mid-1800s attacked retribu-
tion as an improper purpose of punishment because of its association
with discriminatory vengeance against supposed black miscreants. 20
The role of retribution in capital punishment has found its way into
Supreme Court discussions, including discussions of its relevance to
the proportionality of punishments.
Richard Evans has recently completed a voluminous study of ret-
ribution in Ritual of Retribution: Capital Punishment in Germany
1600-1987.2' A clear theme of the history of Germany's capital pun-
117. Id.
118. Although a purpose of the death penalty, retribution extends beyond the
penalty to other criminal punishments. Hence, the question is twofold: (1) Should
retribution be a purpose in any criminal law?; (2) If so, should it extend to the death
penalty?
119. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 5-23
(2002).
120. Id.
121. EVANS, supra note 112.
[Vol. 30:1
The Emergence of the Hellenic Deliberative Ideal
ishment was its justification as a retributive penalty designed to mete
out a proportional punishment for serious offenses.22 Evans traces
the history of the final abandonment of capital punishment in Ger-
many - an abandonment deeply influenced by the Nazis' abuse of
punishment in the Second World War.'23 The German people ac-
cepted the death penalty at the time of its abolition, and only in re-
cent years has popular opinion in Germany swung towards accepting
its abolition.'24 In comparing the German and U.S. approaches to
capital punishment, some commentators have suggested that the im-
portant role of the populace in electing state judges has magnified the
people's power to promote their agenda on behalf of capital punish-
ment. 121
Aside from historical comparisons, several legal and philosophi-
cal analyses have been conducted that explore the notions of propor-
tionality and retribution. 126 Exploring retribution in light of the dif-
ferences between nations invites a philosophical analysis. Retribution
appeals to a cluster of concepts including rights, desert, merit, moral
responsibility, justice, and respect for moral autonomy. 27 The re-
tributivist seeks the just punishment that the criminal deserves and
society has the right to inflict.' A variety of retributive theories de-
pend upon the definition of these key concepts. Is retribution simply
vengeance and if so, is such vengeance justified? If it is not venge-
ance, what is it? Kant suggested that retribution and punishment in
general target individuals who have violated the categorical impera-
tive. Hegel suggests that a wrong is the negation of a right, and pun-
ishment is "the negation of the negation.' ' 129 Hegel suggested that
122. Id
123. Id.
124. Id. This change has been characterized in a variety of ways, such as a general
civilizing process in Europe, a masking of continued oppression, reflecting a changed
attitude towards death, and simply the belated consequence of the Enlightenment.
125. BANNER, supra note 119, at 275.
126. For an excellent brief discussion of these issues, see JEROME MICHAEL &
MORTIMER ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 340 (1971).
127. Id.
128. For a general review of retributive theories, see C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND
PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 38 (1987). More recent jurispru-
dence has placed retribution within the theory of justice. See Samuel J.M. Donnelly,
Capital Punishment: A Critique of the Political and Philosophical Thought Support-
ing the Justices'Positions, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1992).
129. GEORG WILHELM FREDERICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 37-41 (T.M.
Knox trans.), in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (1994).
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this negation must be proportional to the wrong committed.'30 Is ret-
ribution aimed solely at the individual or both the individual and so-
ciety?1
3 1
The philosophical exploration of a concept in comparative law is
a natural outgrowth of the differences between legal regimes that
stimulates the search for more general meanings. Comparative law
theorists during the Enlightenment viewed this process as scientific
universalization. I suggest it is the product of philosophical analysis.
According to Aristotle, the extent of this analysis is constrained
by the practical context out of which the comparison emerges. Thus,
the analyst's quest for the proper theory of retribution is limited by
practical questions such as what the best approach is to punishment
internationally, within the U.S. or Europe, or for a democratic repub-
lic.
C. The Rhetoricians
1. Comparative Law as Materials of Persuasion
Both the Greeks and Romans associated law with rhetoric, which
is the deliberate use of speech to influence others. Greeks and Ro-
mans made and applied a great deal of law before an assembly that
employed rhetorical techniques. Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric
deals with rhetoric in the courts and contains his most extensive
treatment of the law.'32 Isocrates was a Greek oratory teacher who
bridged the work of the early Greek philosophers and the Roman
orators. The Romans devoted the most attention to the rhetoric of
persuasion. Unlike Plato, Aristotle, or Isocrates, the Romans,
Cicero,'33 and Quintilian'34 were practitioners of the art as well as au-
thors on the subject. Like Isocrates, they believed eloquence and phi-
130. Id.
131. Critics of Kant, Hegel, and those who support individual vengeance argue
that the law is properly aimed at a public good, not a private person's moral status.
Consequently, these critics argue that retribution is justified only if it serves some
purpose of the public good.
132. Compare Plato, Laws, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Randolm House 1937) (1924), with ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE'S TREATISE ON RHETORIC
(Thomas Hobbes trans., 1851).
133. Most of the remarks in this paragraph apply to Cicero's works, especially his
De Oratore. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, De Oratore, in 3-4 LOEB CLASSICAL
LIBRARY (E.W. Sutton et al. trans., Harvard University Press 1948).
134. QUINTILIAN, THE ORATATOR'S EDUCATION (Donald A. Russel ed. & trans.,
Harvard University Press 1977) (1921).
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losophy were essential to liberal education and preparation for rhe-
torical practice. But the Romans linked rhetorical practice to the
emerging legal system - an important difference that takes the Ro-
man practice of rhetoric outside the focus of this examination.
Aristotle noted that the Greeks could exercise rhetorical practice
in everyday argumentation, upon occasions of praise, in political de-
liberation, and in the courts.' Knowledge of the law was relevant to
deliberative and forensic argumentation. Isocrates in particular be-
lieved deliberative rhetoric, in which the great political causes of the
day were argued, was the most important kind of rhetorical practice
and that the most important public argumentation involved interna-
tional issues rather than domestic political issues.'36
Isocrates was known for his international argument in Panegyri-
cus.' He argued for a pan-Hellenic union against the Persians which
would respect the individual domestic laws of the Hellenic city states
despite being led by the Athenians. Isocrates believed that excel-
lent rhetoric required natural talent, specific experience in public ar-
gumentation, and a broad "philosophical" education.3 9 In the case of
deliberation, knowledge of foreign and domestic laws was relevant in
assemblies, which used rhetoric to assess and choose the best law for
existing states and new colonies.' 4 From the rhetoricians' point of
view, comparative law was part of the law and, more importantly, the
materials to be used in a persuasive argument. It was therefore no ac-
cident that Aristotle's most extensive discussion of the law is in the
Rhetoric.
For Aristotle, political and legal argument was subject to uncer-
tainty.'4 ' This uncertainty was due to the fact that such argument per-
135. THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 593-94 (W. Rhys Roberts trans.),
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA INC. (1994.)
136. ISOCRATES I (David Mirhady & Yun Lee Too trans. 2000), in 4 ORATORY OF
ANCIENT GREECE 3-6.




140. For an excellent overview of Isocrates' beliefs, see 1 THE INTRODUCTION TO
ISOCRATES ix (1951).
141. This uncertainty was also partly due to the fact that choices were made be-
tween incommensurable goods subject only to rough determination of their means.
Recent scholars have recognized this incommensurability of goods in ancient Greek
thought. Eg., GEORGIOS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS, ARISTOTLE ON THE GOALS AND
EXACTNESS OF ETHICS (1994); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING
VALUES (1990). Independent of such scholarship, many recent legal scholars have
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tained to particular concrete issues which, unlike universals, were
subject only to probabilistic argumentation. Using such legal materi-
als and other arguments could sway the emotions of the decision
makers and overcome the uncertainty of a political argumentation on
the political and legal matters the assembly faced.'
2. Lessons of the Rhetoricians
What implications do the rhetoricians have for modern compara-
tive law? One thesis the ancient rhetorical works suggest is that the
legal alternatives considered in the practical political context of
choosing between incommensurable alternative laws and legal re-
gimes will necessarily involve uncertainty. Choosing laws in a politi-
cal context requires rhetorical argumentation to evaluate the merits
of different laws, which helps overcome this uncertainty.
Rhetoric pervades the discussion of alternatives in both ancient
and modern comparative law. Part of the reason for such rhetoric is
that comparative law topics are frequently the subjects of public con-
troversy. Comparative approaches to abortion, capital punishment,
the proper role of religion within a constitution, and many other top-
ics invite displays of rhetoric on behalf of one alternative or another.
But rhetoric pervades all of law, including legislative histories, legisla-
tion, court opinions, regulation, and even law codes. Some modern
theorists have renewed the classical view that rhetoric is an essential
part of legal reasoning.'
4 3
The approaches to strict products liability in the United States'
and Europe illustrate the role of rhetoric in modern comparative law.
The United States adopted strict products liability as part of the
gradual expansion of liability in the mid-twentieth century.1" The ap-
peal of strict products liability, adopted first by state courts, was to
the need to protect the consumer of mass produced goods, the imbal-
ance of power and knowledge between the producer and consumer,
"rediscovered" incommensurability.
142. Aristotle only found certainty in universals, but also recognized that the pres-
ence of different laws in different jurisdictions may indicate that laws themselves
were the product of convention rather than nature. Hence, much like matters of eth-
ics and politics, certainty could not be achieved. Such uncertainty was also to be
found in the rhetorical arguments before the courts and assembly.
143. CHAIM PERELMAN & LAURIE OLBRECHTS, TYECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Press 1969) (1958).
144. For the history of strict liability in the United States, see JAMES HENDERSON,
RICHARD PEARSON, & JOHN SILICIANO, THE TORTS PROCESS 413 (2003).
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and the promotion of social justice.'45 Later rationalizations appealed
to a variety of economic rationales, including lowering of transaction
costs, spreading risks, and deterring the manufacture of dangerous
goods. 46
When the European Union ("E.U.") promoted strict products li-
ability in Europe, a debate arose.'47 Some suggested that the doctrine
was unfair because it placed liability upon defendant manufacturers
who neither knowingly nor negligently created a risk for the injured
claimant.148 The E.U., whose principal function was to promote eco-
nomic growth (including trade with the U.S.), claimed strict products
liability was "fair," but argued for the doctrine either in economic or
political terms (i.e., the "harmonization" of legal rules among differ-
ent European nations).49
Despite the E.U.'s adoption of strict products liability, its use has
not been widespread.' While the rhetoric of efficiency supports the
doctrine, strict products liability is less relevant in a European setting
where juries have less sway, damage award formulas are different,
and background institutions like the social safety net are less thread-
bare than in the United States. The economic justification for strict
products liability is purely rhetorical since it appeals to "efficiency" as
a social ideal contrasted with other ideals. For example, Italy stresses
the artistry of product creation rather than the manufacture of fungi-
ble products. As a consequence, Italy is reluctant to implement the
doctrine even though the country adopted it to secure membership in
the European Union.5'
D. The Dramatists
1. Legal Judgment in the Context of Emotional Conflict Over
Principle
Law was an important element in the themes of Greek drama-
tists such as the tragedians, Aeschylus, Euripides, Sophocles, and the






150. Spacone, supra note 10; Scott, supra note 10.
151. Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 10; see Howard, supra note 9.
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makes great fun of the would-be Greek "lawyers" in language all too
similar to today's lawyer jokes.5 2 But unlike today's jokes, Clouds
contains the constructive words of "Just Discourse," which proposes a
replacement for a school of "thinkery" (law and rhetoric).'53 Aristo-
phanes suggests a return to the traditional education of music and
gymnastics, which he claims would lead to health and the virtues."
His comparison is between old and new schools of law rather than be-
tween contemporaneously different schools of law. 5
One learns most about comparative legal regimes in the works of
the tragic dramatists, who wrote dramas for contests attended by all
the Hellenic cities. For the most part, tragic dramatists wrote at a
time of conflict between Athens and Sparta and among various city-
states. The themes of love and death involved Kings, gods, and the
rules of the city-state. As Aristotle noted, the dramas were conflicts
designed to evoke a purging of emotions and hence, the law and its
disobedience were seen as part of a culture of feeling.'56
Illustrations include plays such as Sophocles' Ajax and Antigone,
Euripides' The Supplicants, and Sophocles' Antigone, which address
the proper penalty of prohibiting the burial of an alleged traitor. In
Ajax, a quarrel erupts over Mycenas's refusal to permit the burial of
Ajax after an insane Ajax made a failed attempt to kill many of the
Greeks he had fought with in Troy.1 7 In The Supplicants, the Theban
families come to Athens to ask Theseus to make war on Thebes,
which had refused to bury their dead and defeated husbands and fa-
thers."'58 In Antigone, Antigone disobeys Creon and buries the corpse
of his brother.'59 Athens had specific burial laws in addition to the or-
dinary Greek custom of burying the dead. Burial practice and law
had a religious dimension because burial allowed a person to escape
152. Aristophanes, Clouds, in 2 THE COMEDIES OF ARISTOPHANES (Alan Sommer-




156. Aristotle On Poetics, 681, 687 (Ingram Bywater trans.), in 2 THE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE, GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (1994).
157. SOPHOCLES, AJAX (A.F. Garvie ed. & trans., 1998).
158. EURIPIDES, THE SUPPLICANTS 919 (trans. E.P. Coleridge), in THE COMPLETE
GREEK DRAMA (Whitney Oates & Eugene O'Neill, Jr. eds. 2002).
159. SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE 233 (R.C. Jebb trans.), in THE COMPLETE GREEK
DRAMA (Whitney Oates & Eugene O'Neill, Jr. eds. 2002); compare SOPHOCLES, su-
pra note 157, with EURIPIDES, THE PLAYS OF EURIPIDES (Shelley Dean Milman, Pot-
ter & Wodhull, trans., E.P. Dutton and Co. Inc., 1934) (1906).
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wandering the Earth. In times of war, enemies broke off hostilities to
bury their dead - a frequent occurrence in the Peloponnesian War ac-
cording to Thucydides' account.'9 Traitors in Athens were consid-
ered criminals who were left unburied.
It is unclear how these precise laws played out in the conflicts of
the dramas that involved several city-states. The debate as to
whether the king could unilaterally decide the issue complicated these
conflicts. In The Supplicants, Theseus unilaterally decided that the
bodies should be buried, even though the parties were traitors. T6 In
Ajax, Agamemnon relented at Odysseus' urging, resulting in the bur-
ial of Ajax.' 62 In Antigone, Antigone's actions caused tragic conse-
quences.16 ' By the time of Antigone, the issue was universalized into
a conflict between the positive law of the king and the asserted divine
law of family burial. Since either friends or family were involved in
each of the conflicts, the conflict exacerbated the raw feelings of
loved ones who had already lost someone close. Thus, the law was
bound up in family feeling, political power, and religious rules.'6 The
emotional conflict portrayed in the Hellenic dramas resulted in diffi-
cult choices and judgments. Judgment was a key step moving from
deliberation to action and was the intuitively right (sympathetic)
choice of the "equitable" in specific factual situations. In The Suppli-
cants, Ajax, Antigone, and all of the principals lacked judgment and
hence encountered tragedy. The "equitable" means justice, which fits
the circumstances and which may diverge from universal laws that
cannot bend for specific circumstances.
2. The Lessons of the Dramatists
What implication does the dramatists' notion of choice and
judgment have for comparative law? What emerges is not the ordi-
nary paradigm of comparative law - two rules from different jurisdic-
tions, neatly compared or contrasted. Rather, what emerges is a prac-
160. THUCYDIDES, supra note 44.
161. EURIPIDES, supra note 158.
162. SOPHOCLES, supra note 157.
163. SOPHOCLES, supra note 159.
164. Compare SOPHOCLES, supra note 157, with EURIPIDES, supra note 159,
165. This description of judgment is taken from Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics,
in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1032 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941). The concept
has been developed by RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT (1983) and PETER
STEINBERGER, THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT (1993). Anthony Kronman
appears to adopt the concepts of sympathy and detachment discussed by Beiner in
Kronman's THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
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tical judgment - with emotionally charged consequences - between
the incommensurable laws of two regimes. From the Hellenic point
of view, the choice is between incommensurable goods."6 In the case
of Antigone, goods such as obedience to conventional law were in-
commensurate with the religious practices and obligations of family
members. Such a choice involves a sacrifice, and it is unclear if any
universal law governs this situation. At least in the case of Antigone,
the question of who should decide remains tragically unresolved and
is perhaps irresolvable. Action moves on and the law is left behind as
a product of complex culture that may be irrelevant to our fate.
This dramatic portrait of the law illustrates the anguished choice
between regimes and laws, and the resulting emotions. The drama-
tists view comparative law as the search for judgments in emotionally
laden conflicts between different kinds of laws, different regimes, and
conflicts between the laws of the community, family, and religion.
Mary Ann Glendon's thoughtful review of the comparative law
of abortion and divorce in the United States and Western Europe ex-
emplifies the Hellenic notion of judgment in the modern context.
167
Glendon develops a comparative matrix of countries and their gen-
eral laws pertaining to abortion: (1) those with rigid controls; (2)
those permitting abortion for cause, either "hard grounds" (e.g.,
health of mother and rape or incest) or "soft grounds" (i.e., hardship);
and (3) those allowing liberal access to abortion. 6" The spectrum of
countries both opens up the alternatives and provides middle ground
on the issue. Glendon then compares the U.S. Supreme Court opin-
ion of Roe v. Wadd6 9 to a German high court decision.7 ° The Ger-
man court followed a German law shaped by historical reactions to
the Nazi era, formulated the issue as the fetus' right to life, and found
166. Aristotle recognized choice between incommensurable goods. This choice
was not necessarily based upon deductions from a common standard, but often based
upon a dialectical argument which appealed to a variety of considerations, as well as
deliberation which permitted both the specification and modification of final ends.
For brilliant modern accounts of this process, see HENRY RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL
REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS (1994); HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC
AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY (2002).
167. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
168. Id. at 14.
169. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
170. Judgment of Fed. 25, 1975, 39 Bverf G E 1. English Translation: The Abor-
tion Decision of February 25, 1975 of the Federal Constitutional Court, FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Edmund C. Jann trans., Washington D.C. Library of Con-
gress 1975).
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the German statute which provided liberal access to abortion uncon-
stitutional. Glendon makes the judgment that Roe v. Wade is a mis-
take. 7' She concludes that the state legislatures rather than the na-
tional courts would be better off deciding the issue and that, unlike
the German decision, the U.S. opinion insufficiently recognized the
communal aspects of the issue.'72 Glendon contends that allowing
abortion for cause and providing state or federal child welfare and
counseling services would strike a better balance.'
Whether or not one agrees with Glendon's final outcome, her
discussion provides a model for reaching a judgment of a conflict-
ridden issue using comparative law. It is this kind of judgment which
the Hellenics envisaged as an important termination of the delibera-
tive process. The process includes recognizing problems from the
comparative and converging histories of different legal regimes, view-
ing alternative laws in light of a philosophically defined objective, and
using rhetorical arguments on behalf of those alternatives.
V. Deliberative Choice and Modern Tort Law
The present divergence between U.S. and European/Canadian
principles of products liability illustrates not only the role of rhetoric
in the deliberative process but also all the stages of deliberation.
The convergence of international trade, both in terms of actual
trade and in terms of international laws governing trade, requires
harmonizing trade-related laws. Since the 1960s, the United States
has adopted strict products liability, while Canada and Europe have
retained standards of negligence.' 74 Both doctrines raise costs, but in
different ways: strict products liability may increase liability, which
will raise the cost of products, while negligence regimes pose higher
transaction costs.
The convergence of products liability principles requires re-
examining those principle's purposes. U.S. Judge Traynor rational-
ized strict products liability as a way to spread risks and promote
safety. 175 The E.U. considered Traynor's rationale when it considered
171. GLENDON, supra note 167, at 10-62.
172. Id.
173. Id
174. HENDERSON, PEARSON, & SILICIANO, supra note 144.
175. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962); Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
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adopting strict products liability.76 Defenders of the negligence re-
gime in Europe and Canada appeal to the principles of fault and cor-
rective justice. As this example illustrates, using comparative law to
explore the different purposes of contrasting laws promotes philoso-
phical inquiry.
Philosophical inquiry is merely one step of the process. Negli-
gence and strict products liability are part of a larger set of laws and
legal institutions which must also be considered. For example, the
strict products liability rule in the United States was accompanied by
the expansion of class action suits, the contingency fee, the relaxation
of causal requirements, the jury trial, and other devices, such as mar-
ket share liability, intended to facilitate plaintiff recovery.'77 The U.S.
legal system differs significantly from European systems, which have
more limited class actions, no contingency fees, and no juries. Most
importantly, European countries already have a well-developed wel-
fare system which underwrites the compensation for health and dis-
ability.
These larger differences in legal regimes invite rhetorical charac-
terizations of the different legal regimes and classes of legal mecha-
nisms used.178 While both Canadian and British judges continue to
appeal to fairness in upholding a negligence-based regime, U.S.
judges appeal to the instrumental rationales of cost-spreading, deter-
rence, and compensation. 79 The conflicting rhetoric of negligence
and strict products liability cannot be resolved based on theory, as
witnessed by the continuous debate between "corrective justice" and
instrumentalist theories in tort law. Consequently, rhetorical appeals
to fairness on one hand, and "efficient compensation" on the other,
are part of the rhetoric which appeals to emotion and precedes any
final choice between the two tort policies.
The final step in the Hellenic deliberative process is the arrival at
some form of judgment. This judgment may be some form of com-
promise. For example, European courts may adhere to negligence
language while the legislature adopts products liability legislation in
176. Scott, supra note 10.
177. See generally Frank J. Silberti, Emerging Trends for Product Liability- Mar-
ket Share Liability, Its History andFuture, 15 ToURo L. REV. 719 (1999).
178. For a general discussion of British and U.S. cases, see Abed Awad, The Con-
cept of Defect in American and English Products Liability Discourse.- Despite Strict
Liability Linguistics, Negligence is Back with a Vengeance, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV.
275 (1998).
179. Barber Lines A/S v. MA' Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985).
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specific situations.
VI. Comparative Law and Deliberative Democracy
The rise of the Hellenic deliberative ideal as applied to compara-
tive law subjects embraces the four disciplines of history, philosophy,
rhetoric,8 ' and poetics, organized according to the steps in the delib-
erative process. Recovering this early Hellenic approach offers an al-
ternative method to the Enlightenment science approach to compara-
tive law, which has not worked well in the modern world. The
Enlightenment approach treats comparative law as a science and is
consigned to abstruse scholarship that has little practical effect. The
Hellenic approach is both practical and normative. It provides a bet-
ter link to the ongoing legal problems of our age. The art of delibera-
tion offers a rationale for the "quasi-objectivity" of comparative law -
the only level of objectivity one can hope for in comparative legal
matters.
The principle of deliberative choice that the ancients bequeathed
to comparative law does not ensure that we can realize the principle
in our times. Two questions remain: 1) Are modern states even capa-
ble of the deliberative processes?; and 2) Are modern states institu-
tionally capable of choosing among different and comparative laws?
The possibility of deliberative democracy in modern times is beyond
the scope of this article."' However, it is worth noting that delibera-
tive comparative law will be effective only if some deliberative form
of government can be established. Comparative law scholars ignore
this fundamental reality."
180. In a later article, I will distinguish between rhetoric as part of the deliberative
process and legal rhetoric as part of the legal process. The latter kind of rhetoric as-
sumed dominance in the period of Cicero at the end of the Roman Republic.
181. There is a large amount of recent literature on deliberative democracy ex-
ploring both its feasibility and desirability. See, e.g., JOHN S. DRYZEK,
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS
(2000). Of relevance to our inquiry is the inquiry into the adaptability of ancient ide-
als of deliberation to modern states. In this regard, see Miriam Galston, Taking Aris-
totle Seriously.- Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of De-
liberative Democracy, in ARISTOTLE AND MODERN LAW 617-86 (Richard 0. Brooks
& James Bernard Murphy, eds., 2003). Galston argues for the importance of certain
character traits of the citizenry to facilitate democratic deliberation.
182. The role which comparative law might play in modern government may well
depend upon the nature of that government. Thus, it may be appropriate that courts
attend comparative constitutional law if they amend their constitution through inter-
pretation. It may be appropriate for legislatures to consider comparative statutes in
the passage of laws, and for administrators to study the alternative forms of imple-
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Finally, the deliberative approach draws upon attitudes and dis-
ciplines which only emerged after the Hellenic period - the attitude
of detachment and the discipline of legal analysis. Thus, the classical
foundation of comparative law establishes the detachment needed for
modern comparativists to begin comparing regimes, with the disci-
pline of legal analysis of each regime, the interpretation of its laws,
the deliberative choice among the regimes, and the building of uni-
form codes. To effectively utilize the Hellenic deliberation, compara-
tive law must also engage in interpretation ("hermeneutics") and
code creation ("canonics") of law which emerged with the early Ro-
man legal system, the Judeo-Christian faith, and the Roman Empire.
menting those laws. Finally, at least in an informal way, citizens may consider alter-
native laws in political discussion or in the election process.
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